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Things change: 
Women’s and men’s marital disruption dynamics in Italy  




We study women’s and men’s marital disruption in Italy between 1970 and 2003. By 
applying an event-history analysis to the 2003 Italian variant of the Generations and 
Gender Survey we found that the spread of marital disruption started among middle-
highly educated women. Then in recent years it appears that less educated women have 
also been able to dissolve their unhappy unions. Overall we can see the beginning of a 
reversed educational gradient from positive to negative. In contrast the trend in men’s 
marital disruption risk appears as a change over time common to all educational groups, 
although with persisting educational differentials. 
1 Department of Statistics “G. Parenti”, University of Florence. Authors’ names are listed alphabetically. 
Please address correspondence to: vignoli@ds.unifi.it. URL: www.ds.unifi.it/vignoli. 
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1. Introduction  
In terms of family dynamics Italy is customarily viewed as a traditional Catholic 
country, which is true in part, but even here things are now beginning to change. 
Probably the clearest example of this change is represented by the recent increase in 
marital disruption: Between 1995 and 2007 the absolute number of divorces increased 
by 87%. This rapid change is also visible in an upsurge in the Period Total Divorce 
Rate: While in 1995 a hypothetical (synthetic) cohort of 1000 marriages experienced on 
average 80 divorces, this value more than doubled in 2007 rising to 165 (Istat 2009), a 
trend that will likely gain momentum in the future (Castiglioni and Dalla Zuanna 2008). 
Despite this development the study of the causes and consequences of union 
dissolution in Italy has been relatively neglected until recently (e.g., Livi Bacci and 
Mencarini 2009). The analysis of the determinants of marital disruption is nevertheless 
essential to better understand this new phase of Italian family dynamics (Salvini 2009). 
This paper follows the work of Vignoli and Ferro (2009) that studied the basic 
correlates of women’s marital disruption, with at least two new additions. 
First, we want to contribute to the knowledge on the determinants of marital 
disruption in Italy by investigating the possible existence of trendsetters that might be 
mainly responsible for the recent increase of the phenomenon. Has this evolution been 
driven by some population subgroups, e.g., those with a higher educational attainment? 
Does it appear as a result of compositional changes? Or, conversely, is the dramatic 
growth in marital disruption also due to a general increase of the phenomenon among 
all educational groups, in some to a larger extent, in others to a lesser extent? In other 
words, is there an increase over time in marriage dissolution within social groups as 
well? 
Secondly, this research aims at developing the current debate by shifting the focus 
from women-only to a gender-specific comparison. This is particularly crucial because 
since the 1970s the change in women’s and men’s social roles has been very different in 
Italy: While women have faced a remarkable increase in higher educational enrolment 
and, to a lesser extent, in labour market participation, men’s socio-economic position 
has remained quite stable. In short, we analysed the correlates of marital disruption both 
for women and for men, although unfortunately, as Section 4 explains, we were unable 
to do this for couples.  
The article consists of six sections, including this introduction. Section 2 
introduces the theoretical framework of the study. Section 3 explores the peculiarities of 
the Italian context and justifies our research hypotheses. Section 4 presents the data, the 
method, and the variables chosen to scrutinize marital disruption risk. The results are 
presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarises and discusses the findings. 
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2. Social change and marital disruption: Theoretical perspectives  
    and empirical evidence  
The intense transformations of family structures and reproductive choices that 
permeated Western countries in the past forty years have come to be known as the 
Second Demographic Transition. This includes, among other things, the de-
institutionalisation of marriage and the spread of consensual unions, the diffusion of 
modern contraceptive methods, the persistence of low fertility levels, and an increasing 
individualisation of attitudes and behaviours (van de Kaa 1987; Lesthaeghe 1992; 
Sobotka 2008). One of the most visible changes in family life in Western countries is 
represented by the increase in divorce. Although generalized, however, this increase has 
been uneven: more in some countries than in others and, within countries, more in some 
social groups than in others.  
In general terms, a new behaviour in the population does not appear all of a 
sudden, rather, it emerges in certain social spheres (the so-called trendsetters, or prior 
adopters), and later, if "appealing", it spreads to others (Rogers 1962; Mahajan and 
Peterson 1985). The speed of the diffusion process varies. Slow at first, it gains 
momentum and then slows down again when it reaches its maximum and stabilizes. 
This evolution has sometimes been described as having an “S” shape (e.g., Todesco 
2008). It is precisely the experience of the trendsetters that makes family dissolution 
socially and economically sustainable. Indeed, as social acceptability increases, some 
types of costs (e.g., legal expenses) diminish, which, in turn, contributes to the spread of 
the phenomenon. Mass media also play an important role, as they inform new adopters 
about the experiences of prior adopters. New adopters can therefore infer that marriage 
is destined to last not “until death", but rather “until life do us part”.  
The work of William J. Goode (1962, 1970, 1993) has been for decades, since its 
first formulation, the most influential reference for those studying the link between 
marital breakdown and societal factors. He argued that, at least initially, only the most 
"modern" couples have the cultural and economic means to afford a divorce. As the 
social acceptability of divorce increases the relationship between social status and 
divorce tends to become less significant and may even reverse its sign, so that, at the 
end of the process, marriage dissolution could even be more common at the bottom of 
the social hierarchy. 
Education can be considered as one of the most potent proxies of one’s social 
status. In this respect the role of education is twofold. Firstly, it represents a valid 
marker of individual labour market performance and prospects as well as salary. 
Secondly, education is also an indicator of cognitive skills and the ability to solve 
problems. It is therefore not surprising that educational attainment is considered as a 
crucial factor that influences differences in marital disruption dynamics.  
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It is especially the changing role of women that has an impact on the relationship 
education-marital dissolution. Women with higher education tend to be characterized 
by more ‘modern’ attitudes, which are often linked to a lower attachment to the 
institution of marriage. Moreover, women with higher educational attainment and good 
prospects in the labour market, who are therefore economically independent, seem the 
best placed to put an end to a union (e.g., Becker 1981; Ruggles 1997). In this vein 
Blossfeld et al. (1995:202) argue that in those countries where divorce is still rare 
women with high educational levels have a higher risk of marriage dissolution than 
women with lower education because “in such societies marital disruption represents a 
more severe violation of an established social norm”.  
Subsequently, as the rise of union breakdowns comes into play, “divorce customs 
become more permissive for all women and the ‘liberating’ impact of a woman’s high 
educational attainment on marital disruption will decline or even disappear” (Blossfeld 
et al. 1995: 202). The gradient, therefore, may change from positive to negative. The 
highly educated women may in fact have more resources, such as social, cultural, 
economic, and cognitive skills, that together lead to a more stable relationship, either by 
successful partner matching or by enhancing communication skills and other channels 
that make a relationship function well (e.g., Amato 1996). At the same time it is also 
possible that people in the lower social strata have more marital strain because of 
greater socio-economic hardship (e.g., Härkönen and Dronkers 2006).  
Overall empirical evidences suggest that the connection between women’s 
education and marriage instability is likely to be different in different contexts, ranging 
from positive, to no effects, to even negative ones. For example, a positive relationship 
between women’s educational attainment and divorce risk is found for the Netherlands 
by Poortman and Kalmijn (2002) and for Italy (e.g., De Rose 1992, Vignoli and Ferro 
2009). On the other hand in Australia Bracher et al. (1993) found no relation between 
women’s education and divorce. Most of the research on this topic suggests a negative 
association for the Nordic countries (Kravdal and Noack 1989), also when the 
husband’s education is controlled for (Jalovaara 2001, 2003; Lyngstad 2004). 
Interestingly in Poland the divorced seem to be predominantly the low educated (Styrc 
2010). 
In some cases the correlation between women’s educational attainment and marital 
disruption also changes over time. A relatively limited body of literature has explicitly 
addressed this issue and the resulting outcomes display fragmented evidence. In line 
with Blossfeld et al. (1995) a change in the educational gradient of divorce, for 
example, was found by Chan and Halpin (2005) for the United Kingdom and by Hoem 
(1997) for Sweden, where the correlation between women’s education and union 
breakdown has changed over time from positive to negative. For the United States 
education and marital disruption has long been inversely related (Castro-Martin and 
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Bumpass 1989) and the negative educational gradient persisted over time (Teachman’s 
2002) with growing differentials (Martin 2006).  
Altogether the variation of association between women’s educational attainment 
and marriage dissolution over space and time challenges per se Becker’s theory, 
because it suggests that economically independent women are not always the most 
likely to dissolve an unhappy union (e.g., Oppenheimer 1997). 
To the best of our knowledge the association between men’s education and marital 
disruption is much clearer, generally illustrating a negative relationship or, at a 
minimum, an insignificant one. For example, a negative gradient emerged in Norway 
(Lyngstad 2004), in the United States (Ono 1998), and in the Netherlands (Poortman 
and Kalmijn 2002), while no significant correlation has been found so far for Italy (De 
Rose and Di Cesare 2003), for Finland (Jalovaara 2001), and for Australia (Bracher et 
al. 1993). Adopting a couples’ perspective, Jalovaara (2003) illustrated that, when the 
economic situation is controlled for, one should expect the effects of educational 
attainment to show a symmetric pattern between partners. In Norway, however, a 
country where gender inequality is relatively low, Lyngstad (2004) found that the effect 
of the wife's education level is stronger than the corresponding effect of the husband's 
education.  
To summarise, empirical evidences send conflicting messages as regards the 
association between the wife's education and marital dissolution, illustrating differences 
over time and space. On the other hand documented findings converge in suggesting a 
negative relationship between husband's education and separation. Against this 
background we now proceed to reviewing the Italian context in order to develop a set of 
hypotheses on the connection between women’s and men’s educational attainment and 
marital disruption dynamics in Italy. 
 
 
3. The Italian context  
3.1. Marital disruption: Normative regulations and trends  
In Italy it is not easy to obtain a divorce, which has been legally permissible since 1970 
(Law 898/1970), but only after a long period of physical and legal separation between 
the spouses (five years, initially, three years since 1987). For this reason studies on 
marriage dissolution in Italy normally focus on separations and not divorces (e.g., De 
Rose 1992; Castiglioni and Dalla Zuanna 2008; Vignoli and Ferro 2009). For instance, 
of the total number of legal separations obtained in 1995, only 60% ended in a divorce 
during the following decade. The rest of the couples do not (normally) get together 
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again but simply want to spare the cost and administrative burden of a new legal 
formality, which is strictly necessary only if one of the partners wants to remarry.  
Beside these rigid normative regulations Italy still displays one of the lowest levels 
of marriage dissolution in Europe; a crude divorce rate of 0.8 dissolutions per 1000 
inhabitants in 2007, while neighbouring France has 2.2 and the Eu-27 1.5 (Istat 2008a). 
However marriage breakdown in Italy has been on the rise in the past decade. Consider, 
for instance, the Period Total (Legal) Separation Rate and the Period Total Divorce 
Rate for the period 1995–2007 with respect to a hypothetical (synthetic) cohort of 1000 
marriages (Table 1). According to Istat data both measures highlight the rise in Italian 
marital dissolution. Between 1995 and 2007 they increased, respectively, from 158 to 
274 and from 80 to 165, per 1000 marriages. Overall it is not worth mentioning the 
important North-South gradient in the spread of marriage dissolution in the country. 
Southern regions have the lowest separation rates, while the northern ones display 
levels of marriage dissolution close to those observed in Central and Northern Europe 
(Istat 2008a).  
In short, this brief descriptive overview of marriage dissolution in Italy highlights 
the increasing extent of the phenomenon and calls for an investigation into the leading 
factors, which we believe to be related to changes in Italian society over recent decades. 
 
Table 1: Trends in separations and divorces and period total (legal) 
separation and divorce rate, per 1000 marriages, in Italy, 1995–2007  
Separations Divorces 
Years Number Per 1.000 marriages Number Per 1.000 marriages 
1995 52,323 158.4 27,038 79.7 
1996 57,538 175.4 32,717 96.9 
1997 60,281 185.6 33,342 99.8 
1998 62,737 195.1 33,510 100.9 
1999 64,915 203.9 34,341 104.2 
2000 71,969 228 37,573 114.9 
2001 75,890 242.7 40,051 123.8 
2002 79,642 256.5 41,835 130.6 
2003 81,744 266 43,856 138.6 
2004 83,179 272.7 45,097 143.8 
2005 82,291 272.1 47,036 151.2 
2006 80,407 268.1 49,534 160.6 
2007 81,359 273.7 50,669 165.4 
 
Source: Istat, various years (www.istat.it). 
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3.2. Delayed but fast societal change in Italy  
After the mid-20th century, modernization, industrialization, and urbanization spread at 
different paces throughout Europe (Frejka 2008). This led to the expansion of the 
service sector and created a renewed social stratification. Increasingly people had to be 
adequately educated to do their job properly, among other things this led to the 
expansion of educational systems, which attracted large proportions of young people. 
Italy experienced a series of important changes, in society in general and in 
legislation in particular, in a very limited time-span, mainly due to the political 
awakening of the young in the 1960s and the strength of the feminist movement in the 
1970s (Livi Bacci 2001). For instance, advertising contraceptives was legally permitted 
in 1969, divorce was introduced in 1970, and abortion was legalized in 1978. All these 
societal transformations took place under the relatively preoccupied eyes of the Vatican 
and under governments of Catholic inspiration (De Rose et al. 2008). Women’s 
employment also increased rapidly compared to that of other European countries, 
although in Italy it is still low by European standards and Lisbon’s EU targets (an 
employment rate for women of over 60% by 2010). According to Eurostat data, in 1993 
women’s employment rate for the age group 15–64 was 35.8%, compared to an EU-15 
value of 49.2%. The rate for women in Italy rose to 42.7% in 2003, but its relative 
position had not changed much (the EU-15 Female Labour Force Participation Rate in 
the 15-64 age group had climbed to 55.5%). By comparison men’s labour market status 
remained quite stable: The employment rate for men in the decade 1993–2003 
oscillated around 68-69%. All these phenomena went together with a dramatic 
contraction of fertility levels, often linked to the changing status of women in Italian 
society (Salvini 2004; Matysiak and Vignoli 2010). 
The change in women’s societal role is especially illustrated by developments in 
their educational attainment. Today more women than men in the age group 25–44 have 
a university degree. Between the academic years 1970-71 and 2005-06 the percentage 
of women obtaining a vocational or senior secondary school qualification – the Italian 
diploma – tripled, and today about 80% of 19-year-old women hold a diploma (Istat 
2008b). Figure 1 shows an indisputable increase in the proportion of persons aged 25 or 
above with a lower-secondary and upper-secondary qualification ranging from the old 
to the young. It is also evident that, over time, women’s level of schooling has 
overtaken men’s educational attainment, which has remained much more stable in 
recent decades. Overall the trend towards an increasing diffusion of tertiary education is 
easily foreseeable for the coming years (Mencarini and Vignoli 2009). 
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Figure 1: Population aged 25 and over, by educational level, age, and gender, 
2004 (percentages computed by gender) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on ISTAT data, Labour Force Survey. 
 
 
3.3. Research hypotheses  
Past trends suggest a link between rising marital disruption and the increased level of 
education of Italian women. De Sandre (1980) was the first to show the increase in 
marital instability among women of high socio-economic status in the first half of the 
1970s, a finding later confirmed by Corsini and Ventisette (1988), still on aggregate 
data, and by De Rose (1992) on micro data. Incidentally, De Rose concluded that the 
modest diffusion of family dissolution in Italy was to be ascribed, at least in part, to the 
relative backward situation of Italian women, who, with low levels of education and 
scarce and lower-qualified occupational activities, were basically confined to the roles 
of wives and mothers. 
The psychological and sociological research explains why marital instability could 
be originally higher among women of higher social status in Italy (Barbagli 1990; 
Barbagli and Saraceno 1998; Francescato 2002). In these social strata the traditional 
image of the family was weakening, and the psychological, moral, social, and economic 
constraints that prevented the dissolution of an unhappy marriage were frailer than in 
other social groups. In addition the very few micro-level studies available in Italy all 
point to a women’s positive gradient between marital instability and the level of 
education (De Rose 1992; De Rose and Rosina 1999; Arosio 2006; Vignoli and Ferro 
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2009; Todesco 2010). Interestingly the effect of education on the risks of dissolution 
appears much weaker for men (De Rose and Di Cesare 2003). 
This line of reasoning is also supported by the mechanism behind the spread of 
other modern family models in Italy, among which is cohabitation. In this respect 
Rosina and Fraboni (2004) view the diffusion of informal unions in the Italian context 
as a fashion which develops from the high to the low population social strata. 
On the basis of the theoretical premises (see Section 2) and the context review 
outlined in this Section, we formulate a set of hypotheses.  
The increasing rate of marital disruption observed in Italy over recent decades 
might be partly explained by the growing number of persons joining higher socio-
economic population strata. In other words the increasing rate of family dissolution 
observed over time should appear less pronounced after we take into account personal 
educational attainment (compositional change hypothesis). 
We anticipate that, in the Italian context, the trendsetters – i.e., forerunners of the 
spread of marital instability – may be identified among the population with higher 
social status. In other word, we expect that the marked pace of increase in marriage 
disruption started first among the well-educated and was then followed by other 
segments of the population (trendsetters’ hypothesis). 
We have already underlined that the spread of education has been gender-specific. 
The increase of women’s education over generations has been remarkable, while men’s 
educational levels were already relatively high in the 1970s and have remained stable 
through the most recent generations. We therefore believe that the mechanisms behind 
the compositional change and trendsetters’ hypotheses operate differently by gender. 
Women’s changing status in society – represented here by women’s educational status – 
is markedly reflected in our first two hypotheses. Conversely we expect a much higher 
probability of rejecting the compositional change and trendsetters’ hypotheses as 
regards the male population (gender differences hypothesis).  
 
 
4. Empirical investigation  
4.1. Data  
Our data come from the Household Multipurpose Survey, Family and Social Subjects, 
(FSS), the Italian variant of the Generations and Gender Survey. This retrospective 
survey was conducted by the Italian National Statistical Office (ISTAT) in November 
2003 on a sample of about 24,000 households composed of 49,451 individuals of all 
ages.  
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We focussed on the dissolution of the first marriage2, considering de facto 
separations as a marker of the breakdown. De facto separation represents a marriage 
dissolution not yet accompanied by a legal provision that means, in practice, moving 
apart due to marital discord. Similarly to De Rose (1992), we concentrated on de facto 
separation because this act corresponds to the same life-step for all three possible 
categories of separated people, i.e., de facto separated, judicially separated, and 
divorced. In many cases, however, the date of this event was missing, and we had to 
impute it, so as not to ‘lose’ these individuals. We based our imputation procedure on 
the distribution of lags (between de facto separation, legal separation, and divorce) 
observed in women and men with complete information, separately by age and marital 
status. In this way we recovered, 28.7% and 30.1% of women’s and men’s de facto 
separations, respectively. We later ran our event-history model both with and without 
imputed data: The estimated coefficients changed only marginally, but obviously 
proved more robust with the imputed data. 
The study of union dissolution from a gender perspective should preferably focus 
on couples, but in our study we had to focus on women and men separately because 
cross-information was generally not available (we know nothing about ex-partners, who 
were not interviewed). Therefore what we could investigate were similarities or 
differences between women’s and men’s separation patterns over time.  
 
 
4.2. Method and variables  
In this study we applied a continuous event-history model, namely the common semi-
parametric Cox proportional hazard model. We followed each woman and man from 
marriage until de facto separation or the date of the interview, whichever came first. 
Each transition considered in the analysis – the event of interest and the time-varying 
covariates – is measured using the month as the time-unit. 
In order to test the research hypotheses put forward in the previous section we 
considered women’s and men’s educational level as well as calendar time. Using 
information referring to the highest educational level ever reached, we clustered women 
who had finished their education into three groups: low (compulsory education and 
basic vocational education), medium (at least four years of education at the upper-
secondary level), and high (bachelor’s or a master’s degree). Someone may object that 
education should be considered a time-varying covariate (Hoem and Kreyenfeld 2006a, 
2006b). Nevertheless in Italy it is relatively trouble-free to use the highest educational 
2 In this paper we looked at the dissolution of marriages and not cohabitation. This is because in the period 
1970-2003 consensual unions were still very few, especially as an alternative to marriage (Rosina 2007).  
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level, since the vast majority of people have completed their studies by the time of 
marriage formation (Ongaro 2002). 
Moreover the calendar period was introduced in our model in order to capture the 
temporal change in the process of interest and to address the possible existence of 
trendsetters, i.e., well-educated people. The focus on period trends allows us to pinpoint 
accurately changes in calendar time that are harder to locate following a cohort 
approach (e.g., Ní Bhrolcháin 1992). The calendar period covariate may also help to 
capture the influence of changes in the Italian normative environment on marital 
dissolution intensity. Six time periods were considered in the model: before 1980, 
1981–1985, 1986–1990, 1991–1995, 1996-2000, and 2001–2003. 
In addition to women’s and men’s education and calendar time we also introduced 
several fixed and time-varying covariates in order to control for possible additional 
confounding effects.  
We considered women’s and men’s birth cohorts (1938–54, 1955–64, and 1965–
83) to account for the increasing acceptance of new ways of living as couples related to 
increased individual autonomy in the ethical, political, and religious spheres across the 
generations (Lesthaeghe 1992). We expected the youngest cohorts to present higher 
dissolution levels.  
The area of residence was also included in the model to control for the already 
mentioned marked North–South differences in the Italian marital dissolution pattern 
(e.g., Ferro and Salvini 2007). Unfortunately this information was collected at the time 
of the interview, which introduced the risk of performing a so-called “anticipatory 
analysis” (Hoem and Kreyenfeld 2006a, 2006b). However Italian internal mobility has 
been low in recent decades and mainly confined to short-distance movements 
(Tomassini, Wolf, and Rosina 2003). We therefore decided to include a covariate 
describing the macro-region of residence: North, Centre, and South and Islands. 
We also considered parental marriage dissolution when the respondent was aged 
18 (as a dichotomous variable). The literature provides several arguments for the 
positive relationship between parents’ divorces and those of their offspring (for an 
overview, see Amato 1996 and Engelhardt, Trappe, and Dronkers 2002). This may be 
an effect of the transmission of behaviours or, alternatively, a tendency by women and 
men to behave in ways considered “acceptable” by their parents (e.g., Cherlin et al. 
1995; Kiernan and Cherlin 1999). This hypothesis is especially convincing in Italy 
because of a possible vertical diffusion of family patterns (e.g., Dalla Zuanna and 
Micheli 2004). 
We then took into account the role of children in the risk of marital disruption. The 
presence of children seems to consolidate the union (White 1990; De Rose 1992; Hoem 
and Hoem 1992). Becker, Landes, and Michael (1977), for instance, observe that 
children are marital-specific capital and consequently should reduce the risk of divorce. 
Note that some sort of selection can also be in play, people may be disinclined to 
Salvini & Vignoli: Things change: Marital disruption dynamics in Italy, 1970–2003 
http://www.demographic-research.org 156 
conceive a child when they are at the brink of separation or divorce (Coppola and Di 
Cesare 2008). Overall not only the number but also the age of the children represents an 
essential predictor of dissolution risk, because people may be reluctant to separate when 
they have a young child (e.g., Andersson 1997). We therefore distinguished between 
childless, parity 1 with child aged 0–6 years, parity 1 with child aged 7 years or more, 
parity 2 or higher with youngest child aged 0–6 years, and parity 2 or higher with 
youngest child aged 7 years or more. 
Finally we controlled for women’s and men’s employment status, distinguishing 
between “working” and “not working” (time-varying covariate). Acknowledging the 
detailed employment history offered by the used dataset, we built women’s and men’s 
labour market career, splitting for every “employment” and “non employment” spell up 
to the seventh episode. Note that the direction of the link between employment and 
divorce is unclear. In line with the argument of Rogers (1999) for the US context, we 
believe that women whose marriages are unhappy may, in some cases, decide to enter 
the labour market because of their need to cope with a divorce which, they sense, is 
approaching. We explicitly took into account this possibility in our analytical strategy, 
re-classifying as “not working” women who started to work only one year before the 
separation. This correction does not affect our estimates, which we tested both with and 
without this assumption. We anticipated a different effect between women and men. For 
instance, a previous study for Italy revealed that, for employed women, the risk of 
union dissolution is higher than for non-working women, while the same condition for 
men ranges from no effect to a negative one (De Rose and Di Cesare 2003). Even for 
Norway, Lyngstad (2004) showed a negative effect on the divorce rate of the husband's 
income and a positive effect on the divorce rate from the wife's income. To this end we 
consider marital disruption differentials by employment status, but we do not aim to 
detect causal relationship. Women’s and men’s employment status serve here as control 
variables, used to partly remove the contribution of economic situation from the effect 
of educational attainment on separation risks.  
The overall composition of the female and male study populations is presented in 
the Appendix (Table A1), which contains occurrences (de facto separations) and 
exposure times (marriage-months) by each of the variables used in the modelling 
procedure. Respondents with missing values on the variable “parental marriage 
dissolution” were retained in the sample (less than 4% of cases for both sexes), and the 
additional modality “missing” was created for that covariate. In total we compiled data 
on 7,594 women and 9,635 men, of which 797 and 606 respectively experienced (at 
least) a de facto separation.  
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5. Temporal change in separation risks by gender  
The results of our models, estimated separately for women and men, are shown in Table 
2 in terms of relative risks, their standard errors, and p-values.3 The correlates to 
separation risk are all in line with our expectations (see Section 4). First, a quite 
analogous pattern by gender emerges with regards to the effect of cohort and family 
background. There is an increased separation risk for the youngest cohorts, while those 
whose parents experienced a marital dissolution are most likely to separate themselves. 
Moreover the presence of children reduces separation risk, at least while the children 
are relatively young. Interestingly however, as for one-child families, when the children 
grow older marriage stability does not vary much. Looking at the area of residence the 
well-known North-to-South differential is clearly confirmed from our estimates. 
The main difference between the factors affecting the separation risk of men and 
women concerns the role of socio-economic factors. All else being equal, women’s risk 
of separation is significantly higher for the employed and the more educated. Our 
findings seem therefore to be in line with the argument that the degree of economic 
autonomy plays a potent role in the effective chances to handle a separation for women. 
However it is imperative to recognise that the casual link may work in the opposite 
direction. Women whose marriages are unhappy may in fact try to enter the labour 
market because they are about to separate or divorce. By contrast employed and well 
educated men do not significantly differ from their counterparts.  
In order to make an in-depth analysis of the temporal change in marital dissolution 
pattern by gender, we present the calendar time separation risks according to a stepwise 
specification of the full model presented in Table 2. Specifically, several Cox models 
have been estimated, starting from the pure calendar time trend in separation risks, and 
then controlling that trend by adding our considered covariates one by one. 
The increase in separation rates observed in Italy over recent decades is reflected 
in Figure 2a-b both for women and men. As expected, the temporal increase in 
separation risks (controlled for cohort effect) is less pronounced after we include in the 
model specification quite a few selected covariates, all of them significantly correlated 
with separation risks: area of residence, parental divorce, number and age of children, 
and employment status.  
As regards our compositional change hypothesis, the introduction of education 
controls our model for socio-economic structural effect. We find that introducing 
3 The model for women differs slightly to the one presented in Vignoli and Ferro (2009), essentially because 
of a different specification of women’s employment status (here dichotomized) and the absence of control for 
parent’s education. The latter covariate did not show any significant effect in the early study however. We 
choose this alternative specification in order to enlarge our selected sample: we did not exclude, in fact, cases 
with missing values (quite a few) on the type of contracts had over the life course and on the parent’s 
educational level. 
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people's educational level in the model, ceteris paribus, depresses the increasing trend 
in separation risk (see Figure 2a-b, Model 6, which corresponds to the final model 
presented in Table 2). This means that the observed change in separation rates results 
also from an increase in the number of people joining higher social population strata, 
other things being equal. The compositional change hypothesis is therefore supported 
by our empirical investigation. However, even after accounting for this socio-economic 
compositional change as well as the set of demographic and familial covariates, part of 
the temporal change in separation risk remains substantial, especially for men.  
Our findings show that a women’s educational composition effect was in play 
during the 1990s. This effect appears stronger for women than for men. Our gender 
differences hypothesis has thus some empirical support. Men’s socio-economic role, 
which has remained much more stable over recent decades, does not explain an 
important part in the separation risk dynamic. It can therefore be ventured that the 
spread of men’s marital disruption functions as an overall change over time and does 
not appear linked to a socio-economic compositional effect.  
Looking at the whole temporal increase of dissolution risks for the female and 
male populations (Figure 2a-b), the general pattern that emerges is not far from the 
typical “S” shape predicted by the literature on the diffusion of marital instability (see 
Section 2). The speed of the diffusion of marital disruption appears slow at first, it gains 
momentum, and then slows down again when it reaches its maximum and stabilizes. 
This suggests that the new behaviour emerged first in certain social spheres, and later it 
spread out to others when considered acceptable. In this respect an interaction model 
was fitted between the calendar period and educational attainment, in order to 
disentangle marital instability dynamics according to educational level (Figure 3a-b for 
the trends in relative risks; Table 3 for the values of relative risks and their 
corresponding p-values; Table A1 for the descriptive figures).  
At the beginning of the 1970s the introduction of the divorce law gave strong 
impulse to the incidence of separation everywhere in Italy (Barbagli and Saraceno 
1998), especially for highly educated women (De Sandre 1980; Corsini and Ventisette 
1988). At that time, in fact, education represented the most valid proxy of one’s social 
class. Later on those with lower education also evidenced rising levels of marriage 
disruption risks. The trendsetters’ hypothesis receives here an initial validation from our 
analysis. 
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Table 2: Factors affecting separation risk in Italy by gender. Outcomes from 
an event-history model estimated separately for women and men  
    Women  Men 
Variable Categories RR St. Err. p-value  RR St. Err. p-value 
Birth cohort         
  1938-54 (ref.) 1     1   
 1955-64 1.52 0.178 0.000   1.24 0.165 0.099 
  1965-83 1.86 0.321 0.000   1.37 0.267 0.097 
Calendar time*        
 1970-1980 0.48 0.287 0.006   0.67 0.347 0.078 
 1981-1985 (ref.) 1     1   
  1986-1990 1.08 0.281 0.019   1.47 0.480 0.000 
  1991-1995 1.62 0.390 0.000   1.53 0.524 0.000 
  1996-2000 2.64 0.607 0.000   2.56 0.904 0.000 
  2001-2003 2.39 0.464 0.001   2.56 0.962 0.000 
Area of residence        
 North (ref.) 1     1   
 Centre 0.82 0.080 0.044   0.97 0.107 0.766 
  South and Islands 0.59 0.053 0.000   0.67 0.067 0.000 
Parental divorce        
 No (ref.) 1     1   
 Yes 1.89 0.321 0.000   1.92 0.431 0.004 
Number and age of children*        
 Childless (ref.) 1     1   
 1 (aged 0-6) 0.60 0.071 0.000   0.51 0.070 0.000 
 1 (aged 7+) 0.89 0.131 0.442   0.73 0.115 0.045 
  2 (youngest aged 0-6) 0.43 0.060 0.000   0.38 0.057 0.000 
  2 (youngest aged 7+) 0.65 0.100 0.005   0.37 0.065 0.000 
Employment status*          
 Not employed (ref.) 1     1   
 Employed  1.41 0.117 0.000   0.86 0.135 0.350 
Educational level        
 Low (ref.) 1     1   
 Medium 1.65 0.212 0.000   1.61 0.213 0.000 
  High 1.52 0.125 0.000   1.03 0.098 0.764 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on FSS 2003 data.  
* Time-varying covariates. 
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From this time the pace of increase has been particularly gender-specific. 
Women’s increase in separation risk appears first to be driven by women with high 
educational standards. Subsequently during the 1990s a clear catch-up effect of 
medium- and low-educated women is in play, together with a slow-down in the pace of 
increase of dissolution risks for high educated women, together resulting in a 
weakening of educational differentials. This means that in recent years women 
belonging to the lower social strata also seem to have been able to dissolve their 
unhappy marriages. In the last period, then, we can observe a beginning of a reversed 
educational gradient from positive to negative. Overall the new behaviour began at the 
top of the social hierarchy, thereby supporting the trendsetters’ hypothesis. As for the 
male population, our outcomes highlight that low- and medium-educated people appear 
quite similar with respect to marital disruption diffusion, while well-educated 
(trendsetters) men display a systematic higher separation risk (Figure 3b; Table 3). 
Interestingly, also at the time of the most relevant general increase (1996–2003), men’s 
educational differentials remained stable. 
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Figure 2: Trends in separation risk in Italy by gender, 1970–2003.  
Results from 6 event-history models specified as follows: 
Model 1: calendar time + birth cohort; Model 2: Model 1 + area of 
residence; Model 3: Model 2 + parental divorce; Model 4: Model 3 + 






Source: Authors’ elaboration on FSS 2003 data. 
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Figure 3: Trends in separation intensities in Italy by women’s and men’s 
educational level, 1970–2003. Relative risks, by interaction between 





Source: Authors’ elaboration on FSS 2003 data. LR>χ29 (0.95) both for women’s and men’s model. 
Note:  The interaction is controlled for birth cohort, area of residence, parental divorce, number and age of youngest child, and 
employment status. Some dots for the “High education” modality are not shown due to the small-scale sample (less 
than 10 occurrences). 
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Table 3: Separation intensities in Italy by women’s and men’s educational 
level, 1970–2003.  Relative risks (and p-values), by interaction 
between calendar period and women’s and men’s educational level 
 Calendar period 
 1970-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2003 
Women's education         
Low  0.31 (0.300) 0.74 (0.000) 0.71 (0.000) 0.79 (0.000) 1.57 (0.000) 1.49 (0.000) 
Medium 1.20 (0.000) 1 1.32 (0.000) 1.54 (0.000) 2.07 (0.000) 1.25 (0.000) 
High 1.70 (0.000) 1.90 (0.000) 1.62 (0.000) 2.41 (0.001) 1.86 (0.000) 1.04 (0.001) 
Men's education         
Low 0.50 (0.155) 1.04 (0.002) 1.46 (0.003) 1.63 (0.000) 2.89 (0.000) 2.81 (0.000) 
Medium 1.37 (0.494) 1 1.67 (0.158) 1.50 (0.265) 2.70 (0.004) 2.59 (0.008) 
High 1.33 (0.753) 1.74 (0.133) 2.23 (0.015) 2.31 (0.005) 3.49 (0.001) 3.54 (0.000) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on FSS 2003 data. LR>χ29 (0.95) both for women’s and men’s model. 
Note:  The interaction is controlled for birth cohort, area of residence, parental divorce, number and age of youngest child, and 




6. Discussion  
The principal aim of this paper is to contribute to the general study of the patterns of 
union breakdown by adding the case of Italy, which has so far received very limited 
attention. We looked at temporal change in Italian marriage separation risks, applying 
hazard models to the Istat survey Family and Social Subject, namely to the Italian 
variant of the Gender and Generations Survey, Round 1, both for women and men. 
Overall we clearly illustrated that the development of separation risk is now on a 
marked rise in Italy for both genders. The general temporal pattern seems to suggest an 
“S” shape: The speed of the diffusion of marital disruption appears slow at first, later 
tends to increase rapidly, and then slows down when it reaches its maximum. This 
suggests that the new behaviour emerged first in certain population strata, and later it 
spread out to others when considered suitable enough. Our narrative is in line with the 
view of other commentators about the contemporary spread of another innovative 
behaviour in Italy, such as the diffusion of cohabitation (Gabrielli and Hoem 2010). We 
may therefore argue that the country is now undergoing a period of lively demographic 
changes and that traces of the Second Demographic Transition can also be observed 
concerning the spread of a more flexible union pattern.  
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Furthermore our results point to a gender-specific difference in the temporal 
pattern of diffusion of marital disruption by educational level. As for the female 
population, we identified the pioneers of the spread of marital disruption in Italy, i.e., 
women holding higher education. The positive educational gradient seems to suggest 
that well-educated women are more prone to accept new forms of behaviour, as they are 
able to cope with the legal and socio-economic costs of a separation. This segment of 
the population was characterised by a strong increase of separation risk during the early 
1990s, followed by a stabilisation and decline in more recent years. Even in Italy, as for 
other European societies, we can therefore observe in recent years the potential 
beginning of a negative gradient between women’s education and marriage dissolution. 
With the lowering of the socio-economic costs of separations, it may be said that higher 
education may lead to a more stable relationship due to successful partner matching or 
to the improvement of communication skills and other channels that make a well 
functioning relationship.  
With a relatively short time-lag women with lower education are catching up with 
the better educated trendsetters, in a sort of ‘democratization’ of the process of marital 
disruption in Italian society. As a whole the strong increase in marriage disruption 
observed in Italy in the last period appears mainly due to the fact that even the less 
educated women – who are still the most numerous group – are now facing a marked 
increase in separation risk. Their decision to opt for a separation is facilitated because 
the traditional and cultural setting has already been violated by their better educated 
counterparts. In short, a convergence process in the level of dissolution risk among 
various social strata is in play. The fact that the association between women’s education 
and divorce over time is mutable questions in itself the validity of Becker’s theory for 
the Italian context. 
As for the male population, a different story emerges. After accounting for the 
socio-economic compositional change the overall increase in men’s separation risks 
remains substantial, especially in the last considered period (1996–2003). The spread of 
men’s marital disruption appears more as an overall change over time because men’s 
social strata have been quite similar with respect to marital disruption diffusion, with 
educational differentials that have remained relatively stable over time. 
All in all, the change of the pattern of union dissolution let us also expect some 
sort of symmetry between genders. In Italy it is well-established that people tend to 
marry a partner with similar education, namely a homogamy educational pattern in 
marriages can be observed (e.g., Arosio 2006). If such pattern also applies in the future 
this will lead to the presence of many more homogeneous couples in term of 
educational attainment. At the same time, if women’s and men’s social roles become 
increasingly similar, the education-marriage link disruption will not differ between 
partners. Altogether these processes will lead to marital disruption dynamics that are 
increasingly similar between genders.  
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Today’s Italy is still far from this situation and even if the shift of focus from 
women-only to gender-specific differences is important, our analysis has a major 
limitation due to the lack of couple’s data. In fact the study of the determinants of 
marital disruption should be outlined by a gender perspective because of the intrinsic 
dualistic nature of conjugal couple life. Looking at the determinants of conflict between 
partners leads to the consideration of various aspects of a couple’s life such as role 
division and perception, the sharing of duties and resources, and the different 
expectations from a loving and intimate bond. However it is not a straightforward task, 
to test this conceptual framework in Italy due to a severe lack of appropriate data. The 
drawback of our study has possibly led to an overestimation of the correlation between 
women’s socio-economic situation and marriage dissolution risk. The role of women’s 
economic and social status may in fact be mitigated when the partner’s characteristics 
and the gender arrangements of the couple is considered (e.g., Sayer and Bianchi 2000). 
Future research should therefore be conducted using richer datasets that provide 
longitudinal (demographic, social, attitudinal, and economic) information that can be 
related to couples’ marital dynamics. 
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APPENDIX  
Table A1: Transition to separation in Italy: Women- and men-months observed 
in marriages (exposures) and separations (occurrences) recorded in 
the study population according to selected characteristics 
  WOMEN  MEN 










Birth cohort                   
1938 – 1954 1887440 64.32 278 34.88   1559585 68.55 264 43.56 
1955 – 1964 746678 25.45 316 39.65   545786 23.99 230 37.95 
1965 – 1983 300309 10.23 203 25.47   169764 7.46 112 18.48 
Calendar period                  
1970-1980 584105 19.91 66 8.28   351443 15.45 36 5.94 
1981-1985 360489 12.28 78 9.79   274281 12.06 43 7.10 
1986-1990 434429 14.80 94 11.79   346699 15.24 81 13.37 
1991-1995 506021 17.24 150 18.82   415167 18.25 97 16.01 
1996-2000 567655 19.34 252 31.62   477289 20.98 186 30.69 
2001-2003 481728 16.42 157 19.70   410256 18.03 163 26.90 
Region of residence                  
North 1220135 41.58 436 54.71   963367 42.34 301 49.67 
Centre 558385 19.03 156 19.57   411451 18.08 127 20.96 
South and Island 1155907 39.39 205 25.72   900317 39.57 178 29.37 
Parent's divorce                  
No 2872795 97.90 729 91.47   2231630 98.09 544 89.77 
Yes 52308 1.78 41 5.14   31599 1.39 41 6.77 
Missing 9323 0.32 27 3.39   11905 0.52 21 3.47 
Educational level                  
Low 1998165 68.09 360 45.17   1440995 63.34 321 52.97 
Medium 753680 25.68 348 43.66   664274 29.20 203 33.50 
High 182581 6.22 89 11.17   169867 7.47 82 13.53 
Employment status                  
Not employed 1460476 49.77 252 31.62   239428 10.52 53 8.75 
Employed 1473951 50.23 545 68.38   2035707 89.48 553 91.25 
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Table A1: Transition to separation in Italy (Continued)  
  WOMEN  MEN 












Number of children                  
Childless 387074 13.19 203 25.47  338370 14.87 182 30.03
1  (aged 0-6) 468377 15.96 156 19.57  399467 17.56 104 17.16
1  (aged 7+) 387281 13.20 140 17.57  303511 13.34 112 18.48
2+ (youngest aged 0-6) 603330 20.56 114 14.30  480404 21.12 97 16.01
2+ (youngest aged 7+) 1088364 37.09 184 23.09  753384 33.11 111 18.32
Calendar period*Education          
1970-1980 - Low education 473168 16.12 31 3.89  260737 11.46 18 2.97
1981-1985 - Low education 259231 8.83 43 5.40  183167 8.05 26 4.29
1986-1990 - Low education 297096 10.12 47 5.90  221343 9.73 43 7.10
1991-1995 - Low education 328880 11.21 55 6.90  255516 11.23 53 8.75
1996-2000 - Low education 352511 12.01 111 13.93  283684 12.47 100 16.50
2001-2003 - Low education 287279 9.79 73 9.16  236546 10.40 81 13.37
1970-1980 - Medium education 90452 3.08 26 3.26  74034 3.25 15 2.48
1981-1985 - Medium education 81446 2.78 32 4.02  72734 3.20 11 1.82
1986-1990 - Medium education 110740 3.77 35 4.39  99994 4.40 27 4.46
1991-1995 - Medium education 142405 4.85 70 8.78  126784 5.57 28 4.62
1996-2000 - Medium education 173176 5.90 117 14.68  153160 6.73 64 10.56
2000-2001 - Medium education 155461 5.30 68 8.53  137568 6.05 58 9.57
1970-1980 - High education 20485 0.70 9 1.13  16672 0.73 3 0.50
1981-1985 - High education 19812 0.68 3 0.38  18380 0.81 6 0.99
1986-1990 - High education 26592 0.91 12 1.51  25362 1.11 11 1.82
1991-1995 - High education 34736 1.18 25 3.14  32866 1.44 16 2.64
1996-2000 - High education 41968 1.43 24 3.01  40444 1.78 22 3.63
2000-2001 - High education 38988 1.33 16 2.01  36142 1.59 24 3.96
Total 2934426  797   2275135  606  
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